**Chapter 836: World People's Liberation Army (4)**

On July 10, 1942, three days after his long talk with He Rui, Li Runshi received a letter from the WPLA General Staff, forwarded through the Military Commission. In the letter, Cheng Ruofan asked for Li's help in analyzing why Indian revolutionaries were not keen on joining the World People's Liberation Army and for his valuable opinions.

After reading the letter, Li Runshi also felt it was a difficult request. Having worked in India for a time, the characteristics of Indian civilization had left a deep impression on him. He spread out his stationery, initially intending to write a refusal. But thinking of the revolutionary cause, he ultimately did not put down his pen.

The strongest impression India left on Li was its various internal disparities. While India's problems could be analyzed using the methodology of political economy, that analysis suggested the only solution was for India to return to its previous state of fragmentation.

In such a fragmented state, Indian revolutionaries lacked the motivation to commit themselves to the WPLA. There were many reasons, but a representative one was that India currently had no impulse to change its internal state by introducing external forces. Lacking a need for external resources, they naturally had no requirement to go abroad.

Ultimately, Li Runshi wrote down his core views in the reply but did not elaborate. Aside from the complexity of India's problems, Li did not want to waste time on the region. He had once believed India was fertile ground for revolution, but after experiencing many things, he realized he might have been too optimistic.

Compared to India, revolutions in other colonial areas were actually easier. This was because those areas had not formed mature top-down social models; as long as China struck in, drove out the colonizers, and quickly connected the colony's economy to the Chinese market while purging die-hard enemies, those former colonies immediately began to operate smoothly.

Unlike other colonies, India's problem was not about fragmentation versus unification, but that its various regions had never completed a thorough construction of a modern society. Old social systems were kneaded together with the British means of forced integration, forming a stubborn system after 300 years of colonial rule. To break this system, a completely new one had to be introduced first. This process would take a long time.

If China truly wanted to thoroughly transform the Indian region, it would have to undergo a bloodbath across its various nations. Such an approach was neither desirable nor did China have sufficient time.

Especially after his long talk with He Rui, Li Runshi saw a great future possibility along the direction He Rui pointed out. Since China decided to become the world's economic center, it was determined that two Chinas would inevitably appear: one the China of the mainland, and the other a "Chinese Imperialist" China providing financial services to global capital. If the domestic financial imperialist faction gained the upper hand and took the wrong path, these two Chinas would be at loggerheads and incompatible.

Faced with such a difficult problem, Li truly had no time to consider Indian affairs. No matter how much India struggled, it would ultimately only be able to submit to the future world economic order. The most significant factor determining India's future fate did not come from within India, but from China's development.

And it wasn't just India in a passive state; the entire world would be swayed by China, the dominant power.

By the time he finished the letter, most of Li Runshi's brainpower was actually on China. A few seconds after finishing, he completely forgot the matter. He Rui had described many possibilities for China's future during their talk, along with the methodologies behind them.

For instance, the most important thing for China at this stage was not to seize its own interests, but to first strike at its own allies. Only by first placing shackles on its allies could China proceed more smoothly.

Recalling He Rui's words, Li suddenly felt some agitation. He had once thought He Rui's thoughts were all on the bright side; this talk had allowed him to see the incredibly dark part of He Rui's mind. This darkness was not evil, but a realistic methodology of political economy that sought truth from facts.

Among the many methodologies He Rui described, the one that left the deepest impression on Li was the treatment of Japan. In China's traditional thinking, since Japan had contributed greatly, it must be given commensurate rewards. He Rui did not oppose rewarding Japan, but rather used an "open scheme" (Yang Mou) to place shackles on Japan through industrial division.

Li had heard many comrades speak of their concerns about post-war Japan and had considered various plans himself, but he had temporarily been unable to think of a methodology to restrain Japan without offending it.

He Rui's methodology was simple: cultivate Japan into China's most valuable asset. The value of this asset lay in its status as a follower. Japan's greatest weakness was its lack of markets; China needed to use the markets it controlled to restrict Japan's economy to certain fields.

These fields would surely allow Japan to earn abundant returns, but only that. Out of national considerations, China could not use violence or hostile means to strike or restrict Japan, but instead had to constrain it by defining market access standards. This means of restriction first required China to possess powerful strength in industrial and technical development—meaning industrial China must have an absolute advantage. At the same time, it would utilize the internal profit demands of various regional markets to formulate access standards that actually restricted Japan.

Even with Li Runshi's talent, he could currently only understand the framework but hadn't yet been able to straighten it out. Even so, Li was certain that such means were sufficient to keep world development proceeding according to China's intentions for a long time.

As long as this methodology was fully mastered, not only Japan but all other allies would be submissive before China, following China's steps and obeying its arrangements.

After reflecting for a while, Li felt tired. His gaze fell casually on the letter he had just finished. Thinking of India again, Li felt that with this "dark" methodology, India was like a piece of dough that could be kneaded at will.

The means by which China wanted to control India was not violence or conspiracy, but an "open scheme." First, foster a highly progressive concept within India that economic development is the correct direction for the future. Simultaneously, build a very reasonable internal game system within India. Industrial upgrading or currency revolution are both extremely cruel processes.

If the nations of the Indian region fell during the social upgrading revolution, China only needed to spend money to help India quell internal unrest. If China believed that the social upgrading revolution of an Indian nation threatened Chinese interests, it would, at the most difficult point of the reform, provide the most sincere help aimed at "mitigating conflict and helping breakthroughs."

As long as this help was sincere enough—strictly not interfering in internal affairs, but emphasizing that no internal violent revolution must occur—the upgrading revolution of the Indian nations would never succeed. For a truly successful revolution is invariably built upon the foundation of crushing the old classes that obstruct the development of social productivity.

China preventing violent revolution within Indian nations in the name of humanitarianism was not only humanitarian but also unlikely to trigger opposition from other countries, especially gaining the approval of neighbors of the nation in revolt. After all, once civil war breaks out, neighboring countries are destined to be affected. Stability is the demand of a world entering the track of economic development.

The more China did not interfere in those nations' internal affairs, the more violently their internal problems would explode. Then, due to the lack of sufficient social structural change, they would ultimately fail to achieve a breakthrough. Moreover, social revolution itself possesses great uncertainty; even a successful civil war does not mean a successful revolution.

This was the "open scheme" in the methodology He Rui proposed.

Executing such a methodology did not require a genius like He Rui; anyone who could pass through China's republican selection system based on their own merit would have sufficient ability to execute such policies. Because China's means were to let go at the right time and propose completely reasonable plans that benefited all parties. The social and political level of Indian nations was such that if China intervened fully, it might be caught in its own weak points by India. Facing China's "letting go," India was simply powerless to resist.

Theoretically, India could still unite with other nations to solve its own problems. This possibility existed only in theory, because doing so meant first enduring the price of foreign intervention before seeing any results. China didn't need to lift a finger; simply by publishing discussions in international media about an Indian nation being subjected to full-scale foreign intervention, China could use its dominance of international public opinion to make the nationalists within that Indian nation full of distrust toward the upgrading revolution.

Li Runshi had been a Minister of Propaganda; such an operation was but a small trick to him, the cost so low as to be negligible.

Thinking of all this, Li felt He Rui's mood even more keenly. With an incomprehensible vision, He Rui saw the problems China, as the inevitable core of the future world economy, would face. Such a China wouldn't even need colonial expansion or imperialism. China never lacked true nationalist patriots, among whom talented people appeared in succession. At least for the foreseeable sixty years, these patriots wouldn't be completely corrupted. China could easily stand atop the world and play it like a fiddle.

Yet Li Runshi could not move against these people, because destroying them was not just a matter of "striking the rat while fearing for the vase." The world revolution Li identified with was not the opposite of nationalism, but a higher realm transcending it. Destroying China's nationalist elite would be breaking China's spine.

And were those who waved the banner of "cosmopolitanism" truly good? The economic drive for cosmopolitanism was inevitably economic interest; those pursuing global financial interests would surely be firm supporters of "cosmopolitanism."

After reflecting back and forth, Li found that He Rui's jokingly proposed solution was actually the most workable: while maintaining the world's largest industrial system, China would not pursue super-profits. Only if the world economy as a whole was strong enough could China's complete financialization be curbed.

Following this line of thought, one could see the core of He Rui's thinking: "Opposing the 'Global China' becoming a global financial empire." But this path was not without its own drawbacks; if China didn't become a financial empire, it had to remain the world's industrial center. And what drives human initiative is the "will to power"—fame, wealth, greater social influence, and higher social standing are all biological manifestations of that will.

In the evolution of Earth, the will to power ensured the continuation and development of the species; this part of the genetic code has survived to the present. Looking at human development, many do not seek these things to harm others, yet once the drive of the will to power becomes a social righteousness, it inevitably creates countless tragedies. To solve this, as He Rui said, a new way of life must be proposed—using a way of life to balance the negative effects brought by individual pursuits triggered by the will to power.

Li recalled He Rui's talk, which felt like a deathbed entrustment: "The work of shaping the future social way of life must be done by Comrade Runshi." This made Li give a bitter smile; He Rui had truly thrown a massive problem his way. This attitude of entrustment seemed to hide a suspicion that He Rui was being a slacker, trying to escape the responsibility he should have borne!

Having straightened out a considerable line of thought, Li also felt he should put these matters aside for now. If he continued to dwell on them without seeing these social realities, his thoughts would inevitably slide toward idealism.

One of the specific tasks before Li was observing the economy and preparing for the highly likely aid to the Soviet Union. Currently, Li also served as Vice President of the Party School, and one of the powers of this position was selecting talent. What Li had to select were the people to support the Soviet Union.

Meanwhile, the letter Li wrote was first filed with the relevant Military Commission departments for backup, while the original was sent to Cheng Ruofan. When Cheng first read it, he simply couldn't catch the main point. After several re-readings, Cheng still wasn't sure his understanding was correct and could only call a meeting for discussion.

Once the democratic meeting began, the views raised by the comrades immediately opened up Cheng's space for reflection. The attendees first confirmed one thing: the current priority for Indian revolutionaries was solving their domestic problems. This was highly consistent with the view of Brigadier General Wu Guangzu, who was previously in charge of the matter.

In the subsequent analysis, the comrades identified a phrase in the letter: "technology spillover." Based on the basic framework of technology spillover Li Runshi proposed, many things became much easier to understand.

Li believed the current Indian revolution had encountered a ceiling. The core limiting it was India's internal powerful tradition, which provided enough social stability. Britain, which had long colonized India, was one of the few industrial nations on Earth; although the British hadn't deliberately cultivated Indian industry, the effect of "technology spillover," along with the large number of administrative, judicial, and technical personnel the British trained to facilitate their rule, had indeed encountered more advanced industrial civilization through that spillover.

But "spillover" meant the knowledge India obtained was non-systemic and entirely dependent on the British industrial system. This made the nations of the Indian region appear to have everything—railways, factories, administrative systems, and parliamentary models left by the British could all be utilized directly.

A deeper influence was India's own perception. As a British colony, India had truly had full contact with and understood Britain. They knew that the world hegemon of not long ago had indeed maintained its status through these political, economic, and cultural models that the Indians had seen.

The parliamentary system India established was learned from Britain, which had the same system at home. India's industrial equipment was made in Britain, and the many Indian technical personnel who had worked in Britain used the same equipment and production methods.

This led the nations of the Indian region to believe that they had no intention of becoming a world hegemon capable of competing with China. If their goal was to become an industrial power like Britain, the British system was what they were familiar with; as long as they took it and used it directly, they could fully develop and become a regional power with strength comparable to Britain's.

At this point in the analysis, Cheng Ruofan felt his problem was solved. But a new problem was clearly presented. India truly did not understand the "technology spillover" Li Runshi had proposed.

Li's analysis report also raised the "capability for national independence and self-reliance." China had walked this path under He Rui's leadership. Cheng sighed, "Self-reliance is not that easy. Under the Chairman's leadership, every large-scale investment undertaken by the state has succeeded. And during that success, we obtained investments and technology transfers from Britain, France, and America during the First World War and the subsequent civil war between the Red and White armies. Then, through cooperation with France, we bought almost their entire industrial system. After the Japanese revolution, we fully utilized the industrial and technical results accumulated since the Meiji Restoration. Over the past decade or so, there have been 150,000 French and Japanese experts working in our country, and there must have been 1 million person-times of technical workers coming to help China receive technology.

With the Chairman's guidance, using every resource available, plus the people's hard struggle, throwing in nearly 10 billion US dollars of investment, and having China's own advanced civilization as a foundation—along with a national consensus to complete industrialization and thoroughly change China's weak position—even so, our path has been extremely painful and arduous!

Can these small nations in the Indian region stand on their own? Do they even know what self-reliance means?"

No one answered. The content Cheng described reminded the comrades of their own pioneering days, of the "Foolish Old Man Moving the Mountain" spirit that had erupted in an era when they knew nothing yet were full of confidence.

Looking back now, that sacred "folly" had its problems, yet it was truly pure and pious. To expect such self-sacrifice to appear in India... difficult!