Time sped by, and soon it was July 1, 1945. A significant portion of the capitalist class engaged in economic activity approached the day with mixed emotions. For those who had expected the economic and political landscape of 1945 to undergo massive fluctuations, the current stability was a source of frustration.

The Asian edition of *The Economist* went so far as to lead with a front-page headline: "He Rui likely didn't expect his political influence to dissipate so quickly."

The long-established newspapers of the old industrial powers possessed keen political sensitivities and an irrepressible urge to stir up trouble. Facing the new global hegemon, the editors of *The Economist* cast aside all restraint. They sensed a familiar scent emanating from within China: the national capitalists who had risen during the He Rui era were becoming impatient for greater economic power.

Where there is a crack, there are those ready to pry it open.

The lead article could not, of course, directly insult the late Chairman. Instead, the editors argued that the hyper-centralization of the He Rui era should now give way to a period of decentralization. Decentralization, they claimed, was beneficial to the global economy. Their entry point was the World Bank system that He Rui had worked so hard to promote during his life.

In He Rui’s plan, the World Bank model drew heavily from the US Federal Reserve. Just as the Fed was composed of major American banks, the World Bank was to be composed of the central banks of all nations. To facilitate more effective consultation and cooperation, He Rui had even sent invitations to Fed bankers and economists during the war, asking them to lecture in China.

While the experts had remained silent during the conflict, they had arrived in droves once the fighting ended, providing extensive technical and structural support.

Using this as a pretext, the editors of *The Economist* argued that China required a systemic economic reform: selling the ownership of Chinese assets to international partners to construct a completely new economic model.

The article concluded with a sentimental projection of the future: "Only free finance can promote free economic development, breaking the barriers of global trade and creating a future world of peace and security."

The front-page piece immediately triggered a backlash among Chinese readers. Those willing to pay for a subscription to *The Economist* generally possessed a degree of economic literacy, and those who supported domestic capital recognized the subtext: an attack on the Li Runshi government. Furthermore, the attack was phrased in a way that resonated with Chinese culture, accusing Li of failing to "maintain the path of the predecessor for three years." It characterized He Rui’s basic policies as having been abandoned and charged that Li’s economic policies aimed to restrict the free flow of capital—a move that would inevitably fail to achieve the global financial order He Rui had intended.

Li Runshi had once remarked: "A party without factions is a palace of imperial thought; a party without wings is a house of bizarre curiosities." Even among those who supported decentralization, there were several factions. The most sophisticated belonged either to the "International Capital Faction" or the "Local Industry Faction." Their names alone revealed their origins.

Politicians the world over keep the specific details of their plans for their goals strictly confidential. When He Rui had begun full-scale war preparations in 1937, he had broken the plan down into numerous policies—"increasing leisure time," "universally raising the people’s cultural level," "stimulating the economy through infrastructure"—to make them palatable to the public.

In reality, his internal explanation to the Party was simply: "To combat the economic crisis, we must stimulate the economy through state investment." Within the entire Party, fewer than ten comrades knew the true objective of the plan, and fewer than five understood its overall structure.

Yet politicians never hide their underlying theories. In America, Roosevelt had utilized his fireside chats to ensure the public understood the theoretical foundation and internal logic of the New Deal. In Germany and the Soviet Union, the leadership exerted every effort to promote their core ideologies through articles and speeches.

He Rui had been doing the same in Japan since 1911. He wrote books and articles, commented on current affairs, proposed solutions to complex problems, and explained the social issues of the day. His prestige had been built brick by brick.

Consequently, the changes triggered by various policies and their secondary effects had been described clearly by He Rui in his numerous writings.

Just as capitalists only understood what it meant to be a bourgeoisie after the publication of Marx’s *Capital*, the Chinese bourgeoisie had rapidly attained "self-consciousness" through the vast body of knowledge He Rui provided. They began to recognize the difference between the International Capital and Local Industry factions and attempted to choose their side.

*The Economist*’s article deeply offended the Local Industry Faction. The rise of international capital meant the local industrialists would inevitably fall under its control. At this stage, they viewed the internationalists as a morally bankrupt class of rentier vampires who were willing to sell out national sovereignty.

The prospect of international capital carving up Chinese state assets to form a global alliance was something the local industrialists could not accept.

Private cursing was not enough. The Local Industry Faction immediately launched a counter-offensive in the press, exposing the nature of the internationalists and pleading with the Chinese people not to be seduced by them into a betrayal of the nation.

But the bourgeoisie remained the bourgeoisie. While hammering their rivals, the local industrialists did not forget to insert their own "private goods," cryptically expressing their own desire for a piece of the state-owned pie.

The leadership of the State Council understood the domestic bourgeoisie well and did not take these verbal skirmishes too seriously. In any normal nation, public power possesses an overwhelming advantage. Even in America, capital could not enact policy that affected the nation's foundation without the state’s approval.

Public power is not inherently pro-people or pro-capital; its policies are influenced by whoever can provide the resources required for its existence. Bureaucracies do not produce wealth; they must extract it.

The leadership under Li Runshi had a deeper understanding of this reality. Within the He Rui government, He Rui and many of his subordinates had been that rare breed of talent in human history who could personally conduct R&D and drive social progress. Thus, the government did not particularly care for the emerging bourgeoisie, as they had not yet become a significant force.

This was understood not only by the government but by the bourgeoisie themselves who had survived the past twenty years. Though they came from diverse backgrounds—some from old money—they were fundamentally different from the parvenus who typically rose after a traditional Chinese dynastic change.

Traditionally, a new central government would gain knowledge and human resources from the new elite, necessitating a deal of interests. The He Rui government, however, possessed its own knowledge and resources. It was the extraordinary performance of the men led by He Rui that gave the government its current absolute dominance.

Among these new capitalists, the Local Industry Faction were essentially the technical "disciples and grand-disciples" of the He Rui government regarding core technology. The internationalists, though they denied the lineage publicly, knew in their hearts that the men who controlled the core productive forces were also their teachers.

With their very heritage rooted in the current regime rather than the old era, the new bourgeoisie unconsciously acknowledged that the "New China Legality" promoted by the Li Runshi government was unshakeably correct. Since the government held this rock-solid legitimacy, the bourgeoisie could do little more than bark occasionally to see if they could fool a few minor officials. They held no expectation of truly influencing core government policy.

Li Runshi currently cared little for their opinions. He was occupied with two tasks: completing the construction of the New China Legality and promoting the Chinese-led world economic order.

July 14th was the day for the publication of the semi-annual economic data. The latest figures were so positive they took the State Council by surprise.

Once the data was out, the role of economic policy became easy to explain. An article titled *Chairman He Rui’s Phased Judgment Proven Correct Once More* was published in the *National Daily*.

The editors of the *National Daily* had no intention of engaging in a direct duel with the likes of *The Economist*. They felt the Western press was unworthy of such an honor. Yet the two articles corresponded perfectly, triggering an immediate discussion.

He Rui had argued that although China had achieved a full industrial chain encompassing every mainstream technical niche over twenty years, and possessed many brand-new industries, its history of industrialization was still brief. Thus, China’s new technology represented its future industrial advantage.

China’s *current* advantage lay in its capacity for large-scale production of cheap, low-end industrial goods. These were primarily labor-intensive industries like textiles and agricultural tools.

Following the liberation of Asia and Africa, the local productivity in those regions was low. What the people there needed most to raise their level of development was precisely these low-end goods.

With a massive supply of cheap metal farm tools, the productivity of the local agricultural populations surged. Beyond increasing yields per acre, the time saved allowed them to mobilize labor for irrigation and land reclamation, thereby increasing both local productivity and income.

With cheap textiles, the health of the liberated peoples improved as the rate of infection and injury dropped. Combined with the basic healthcare systems China helped them build, their health was further elevated, providing more labor power.

Because of this synergy, China solved its domestic employment issues through exports, enabling it to provide more development capital to the world. The liberated peoples, enjoying the dividends of industrialization, developed their own economies and naturally gained greater purchasing power, which in turn continued to elevate their national economic levels.

This was the fundamental theory behind the New World Economic Order established by China—and the inevitable result of its successful operation.

Although the *National Daily* made no mention of the "International Capital Order" proposed by its rivals, the data and the tangible sense of development spoke for themselves. The media offensive launched by the internationalists was easily neutralized by reality, failing to spark further debate.

Having won this round, Li Runshi pressed on with his policies. The only figures with the prestige to challenge him were the old Premier, Wu Youping, and the five Marshals. Wu was retired and had told Li privately: "Conduct your investigations. If you need me to step forward, just say the word."

Li trusted Wu Youping’s integrity implicitly. The high command of the He Rui government were mostly nationalists, but the proportion of idealists was staggering—estimated at between five and nine percent based on Li’s own personnel surveys during his time at the Party School. This was an extraordinary ratio. Idealists are defined by their faith—a faith that does not shift with leaders or social environments.

Wu Youping was one such man. He might overlook crime for the sake of the greater good temporarily, but once the situation changed, he would not hesitate to move against the offenders. As long as he breathed, he would not let them escape justice.

The five Marshals were likewise idealists. Though they were all in their fifties, they clung to their convictions. In their worldview, a prison was where a criminal belonged.

So long as the central leadership remained united on this front, Li Runshi’s path was clear. Soon, the various problems that had emerged during the war began to be systematically addressed. A large number of treacherous merchants fell from grace, followed by their collaborators within the system. For a time, the European media was in an uproar, with articles appearing daily regarding the "Great Purge."

The news naturally reached the Soviet Union, where it sent a chill down the spines of the cadres. They had their own share of "troubles" from the war years, and they feared that Stalin, ever the man of the iron fist, would follow Li Runshi’s example.

Having barely survived the Second World War, the cadres had no desire to end up in a prison cell or before a firing squad.

Unconsciously, a wave of opposition to Stalin’s heavy-handed rule began to stir within the Soviet Party and government.