**Chapter 846: Aiding the Soviet Union (3)**

On August 20, 1942, in Kiev, the headquarters of German Army Group South, Field Marshal von Reichenau received word that after seizing Kharkov, his spearheads had reached the outskirts of Stalingrad.

Colonel General Manstein, Chief of Staff of Army Group South, studied the map. Hitler had met with him before the war and suggested that the Southern Group's goal should be to control the resources of the southern Soviet Union. Reichenau's view was simpler: the Southern Group's most critical current objective was to completely sever the Trans-Siberian Railway.

Connecting Moscow and Vladivostok, the Trans-Siberian was the most vital transport line for Sino-Soviet trade. Manstein supported Reichenau's view; only by severing the link to China could the USSR be left truly isolated and helpless, allowing the Wehrmacht to seize the Western Soviet Union while it held its massive advantage.

Geographically, the best point to cut the railway was Omsk. However, Omsk was too far and lay north of Lake Balkhash. Historically, the area south of the lake had been Chinese territory until taken by Russia. After the He Rui government became the central authority of China, the USSR had returned a portion of those lands, including the region south of Lake Balkhash. Now, the presence of the Chinese military there made the Germans wary of pushing too far west.

Since Omsk was out of reach, the initial German objectives were Yekaterinburg and Chelyabinsk. Currently, however, even those seemed difficult to achieve.

Manstein's thoughts were interrupted by Reichenau: "Stalingrad will not be an easy fight. We must prepare a strike force to attack Samara after the Soviet forces have been maneuvered."

Having received the order, Manstein immediately considered the best candidate for the task. Soon, he asked, "Field Marshal, General Rommel might be the right man."

Reichenau quickly recalled the short-statured Rommel. During the Western European campaign, Rommel's 7th Panzer Division had performed exceptionally well, its thrusts decisive and resolute. His adaptability, in particular, had left a deep impression on Reichenau.

"Have Rommel report to headquarters," Reichenau ordered.

In Moscow, Marshal Zhukov's mood was slightly calmer than it had been a month ago. Frontline news remained dire, but the Red Army command system had finally been unified. A large number of commanders had been replaced, with many officers once struck down by the Tukhachevsky faction returning to command. While these officers were not perfectly suited to the current high-tech war, they possessed rich experience in defensive operations and were slightly better at delaying the Wehrmacht than those they replaced.

More importantly, after losing over three million elite troops, the General Staff no longer considered head-to-head offensives against the Germans, but focused on holding the lines. After the loss of massive armored units, Soviet tactics had also changed. The remaining Soviet armor was now primarily used for counter-thrusts against German panzers to block breakthroughs. The infantry's task was to hold their lines to the death, with retreat permitted only when other sections of the front became untenable.

Being on the receiving end was painful, but the General Staff had no choice. Nearly half of the men in many units had been drafted only after the German invasion; their combat effectiveness was best utilized in trenches. At this stage, they had to rely on these units to hold out until winter, when they could deploy troops with six months of training for a counter-offensive. Launching an all-out counter-offensive now would only exhaust the Red Army's remaining strength.

Fortunately, Zhukov found that the new tactics were working. The German offensive remained sharp, but under the Red Army's targeted operations, it was no longer able to breach the lines and encircle army-sized concentrations as easily as in the first three months. Thus, Zhukov turned his attention to maintaining the current situation.

Soon, the Red Army's Chief of Logistics delivered a list of requirements. Zhukov scanned it, his eyes lingering on the demand for trucks. On this list, the General Staff requested 600,000 heavy trucks. Even knowing they wouldn't get that many, Zhukov offered no corrections.

One fights the war one's logistics permit. 600,000 trucks was the requirement for the Red Army to fully unleash its potential, not a minimum to prevent a collapse. How many could be provided was a matter for the leadership, not the General Staff.

The requirements list soon reached the Kremlin. Stalin, no longer directly interfering in details, passed it to Kirov's working group for analysis. Soon, Kirov reported to Stalin the extent to which these needs could be met.

To Stalin's surprise, over 75% of the logistics requirements could be satisfied. Of course, this wasn't a flat 75%; for food, uniforms, and small arms ammunition, the fulfillment rate was nearly 100%. The rate for uniforms actually exceeded 100%, reaching 108%.

The fulfillment for artillery and tanks was lower, at 68%, because a vast number had to be allocated to training units—especially those Red Army units being rebuilt after being annihilated in the first phase.

Trucks had the lowest fulfillment rate, at only 24%. After Kirov finished, Stalin raised a question about the truck supply. Kirov then invited Mikoyan in to answer.

Mikoyan had come prepared and explained immediately: "General Secretary, our domestic truck production can currently only satisfy 24% of the demand. However, we are adjusting our production model. Until the second track of the Trans-Siberian Railway is completed, we will reduce the import of complete vehicles and use the freed-up capacity to import more Chinese-made truck components for domestic assembly."

Stalin understood the arrangement. Since its founding, the USSR had faced various blockades, so it had always emphasized self-reliance. Even with China, which had never blockaded them, the USSR had no intention of full reliance. Among imported equipment, trucks were high-value items, so Soviet truck imports from China had never been high. An arrangement that benefited the USSR in peacetime presented problems during war.

Stalin didn't blame anyone but asked about the progress of cooperation with China on trucks. Mikoyan reported that China had agreed to the Soviet request, with China First Automotive Group (FAW) providing assistance.

Hearing it was First Auto, Stalin vaguely recalled that when China cooperated with France, they had established the Guangzhou Automobile Company together. French trucks were of a high standard; for Sino-Soviet cooperation, perhaps Guangzhou Auto would have been more suitable.

Mikoyan explained that First Auto was a company He Rui had established during the Northeast Government era. Being located in the Northeast, its products were primarily for northern users and were naturally designed for northern climates. Guangzhou Auto's partnership with France was because the French climate was closer to Southern China's.

With that answer, Stalin inquired about production volume. Mikoyan's response didn't satisfy him, but there was no other way at this stage. The Trans-Siberian's capacity was limited, and while China was working to open the Arctic shipping route, the USSR had previously not opened those regions to China. Lacking such cooperation, China—despite its powerful shipping—couldn't immediately master the Arctic route.

After Mikoyan left, Kirov asked, "General Secretary, the Chinese side has privately proposed that if an inner-Asian railway line could be completed, or at least a Central Asian transport route opened, it could largely satisfy our needs."

Hearing this, Stalin didn't even pause to reflect, answering instantly: "Absolutely impossible!"

Kirov didn't try further. He had asked from the standpoint of reducing Soviet war losses, but from a national strategic height, the USSR truly could not allow China free entry into Central Asia.

Once Kirov left, Stalin lit a pipe and looked at the Central Asian region on the Soviet map.

Geopolitically, Central Asia lay at the junction of Asia and Europe, situated between the great or regional powers of Russia, China, India, Iran, and Pakistan. It was the transportation hub linking the Eurasian landmass, the essential passage for East-West and North-South movement, and the route of the ancient Silk Road.

According to Soviet research, the nomads of Central Asia had long been in conflict with the surrounding agrarian peoples. The nomadic lifestyle was clearly more suited to war; their steppe cavalry was once the world's most powerful military unit, but their combat power was often checked by internal fragmentation. The Silk Road across Central Asia often promoted nomadic unity, periodically producing great leaders to unify the tribes into an almost unstoppable force. The Huns' pillaging of Europe, the Wu Hu era in China, and the Mongol Empire that nearly conquered Eurasia all occurred this way.

In 750 AD, the Tang General Gao Xianzhi eliminated the state of Shi (Tashkent), extending Tang influence into the Afghan region. But with the Tang defeat in Central Asia and subsequent internal chaos, China shifted from competing for the region to a defensive posture. Until the rise of the Mongols, most of Central Asia belonged to the Chagatai Khanate.

By the late 17th century, the advantage of the nomads and semi-nomads ended as the development of firearms and military technology gave dominance to settled peoples. Persia, Tsarist Russia, and Qing China all expanded; in the 18th century, much of the region fell under Persian influence, but Tsarist Russia overtook them, defeating Persia in the Russo-Persian Wars. By the end of the 19th century, the Tsars occupied most of Central Asian territory.

The Soviet-controlled Central Asia underwent industrialization and urbanization, but this was accompanied by suppression of local cultures and environmental issues. Thousands died in the agricultural collectivization movement, causing long-term ethnic tension. Furthermore, Soviet resettlement policies moved millions into Siberia and Central Asia—sometimes entire nations—creating new conflicts.

Stalin pondered the current situation in Central Asia. Since the He Rui government unified China, they had first restored the Han Dynasty name for Xinjiang: "The Western Regions" (Xi Yu). According to Soviet Sinologists, "Xinjiang" meant "New Territory" in Chinese, while "Western Regions" was a geographical term referring to the lands to the west.

Renaming Xinjiang to the Western Regions signified a change in cultural philosophy and implied that China likely intended to use the region as a springboard into Central Asia.

Stalin could never accept China partitioning Central Asia, nor could he accept an expansion of Chinese influence there. Opening a Central Asian railway meant opening the door to a Chinese economic invasion. Stalin believed he must never leave such hidden conflicts for future generations.

After reflecting for a while, Stalin called Beria to inquire about the Chinese experts sent to the USSR.

Beria naturally guessed Stalin's unease. "General Secretary, to date, based on agreed aid projects, China has dispatched 7,566 engineers and 14,238 technicians to the Soviet Union. The number of Chinese experts required for projects currently under negotiation is around 40,000. For projects listed for discussion, a rough current estimate is that 60,000 Chinese personnel will arrive. To place them all under full surveillance, we would need to add 10,000 KGB members."

Stalin waved his hand immediately. "No need for that. What we need to focus on is the influence of these experts on the Soviet Union, not worry about them stealing our technology."

Beria knew Stalin was right. These Chinese experts were here to aid the USSR, not as manual laborers. Since it was aid, China clearly possessed technical capabilities the USSR lacked—capabilities desperately needed now. Thus, guarding against them stealing Soviet technology was pointless.

However, Beria didn't assume Stalin was at ease with the Chinese. He asked further, "Then regarding the security protection of the Chinese personnel, should it be made more meticulous?"

"Of course!" Stalin replied. Yet after saying this, he felt a deep disappointment.

"Have Bukharin attend the meeting," Stalin ordered.

Bukharin didn't know that because of the changes in China, his own fate had been altered. In the original history, in the 1937 film *Lenin in October*, there was a famous line: "Tell Comrade Lenin that Bukharin is a traitor."

Now Bukharin, while not at the absolute core, was at least within the inner circle and had not been killed. The reason for this change lay in the 1920s, when Stalin—completely unprepared—took charge of Sino-Soviet trade. This led to the USSR avoiding the total blockade it faced in history.

Trade with China provided the USSR with enough light industrial goods to trade with its rural population, significantly easing agrarian contradictions. This mitigation, along with an economy much better than in history, made Stalin's industrialization results brilliant, lowering internal party opposition to the point where Kirov's assassination didn't happen and the CPSU's basic unity was maintained. Otherwise, with his political views, Bukharin would have been eliminated long ago.

In the relatively relaxed domestic environment, Bukharin's views had gradually gained attention. More importantly, his own outlook had changed.

When Bukharin joined the discussion, it soon turned into a situation where he, the editor of *Pravda* in charge of party propaganda, did most of the talking while Beria listened intently.

Bukharin first acknowledged Stalin's concern: China indeed held an advantage in ideology. Toward personnel from Europe, the CPSU had always been very confident in inviting them to visit the USSR, not minding them communicating with the Soviet people. Since the USSR had implemented socialism and taken the communist path, it held high moral confidence. While not wealthy at this stage, it was politically more advanced than Europe.

This attitude had indeed brought the USSR great benefits, with many progressive figures from Europe and America proactively seeking to serve the Soviet cause.

But between the USSR and China, the situation was reversed. The standard of living on the Chinese border surpassing the Soviet side was a matter of only the last six or seven years. And the economic disparity was manifested not in basic needs, but in various new lifestyle products.

While food and drink differed little, radios and televisions had entered ordinary Chinese homes in large numbers, and Chinese families had begun buying motor vehicles. this lifestyle gap highlighted the disparity between the border populations of the two nations.

One must realize that in Europe, few countries had private cars. People on the European and Soviet borders still traveled by animal power. Since the Soviet border now met Eastern European states, it was actually the bicycles and motorcycles of Soviet border families that the Eastern Europeans envied.

Aside from lifestyles, China's political field was in no way inferior to the Soviet Union's. The weakness of the Qing had left China as a passive victim of aggression, its few border victories occurring on its own soil. This allowed China to claim it lacked any aggressive malice—a propaganda claim the whole world had to acknowledge as reality.

Besides its "clean" history, China's ideological morality was beyond reproach. The Chinese Civilization Party, like many left-wing parties in Europe, called itself a socialist party following a communist line. While in Soviet and European eyes, the Chinese model could not be compared to the Soviet one, China had established another model of Marxism and Communism from an academic perspective.

In the Soviet explanation, Communism was a revolutionary ideology.

In the Chinese explanation, Communism was first and foremost an academic concept; based on the advanced nature of this concept, the logical conclusion was drawn that the capitalist system was destined to perish. Thus came the socialist revolution—an effort to forge a new path suited to high levels of productivity.

Since the USSR and Western nations didn't believe the He Rui government was a "true" Communist Party, this framing held high influence among the moderate left in the West.

Within the CPSU, a portion of the core leadership led by Stalin had actually realized that China was competing with the USSR for ideological leadership.