Who is the Oriole (18)
Volume 7: World War II · Chapter 69
Following the Great Naval Battle of the Marshalls, every American officer and sailor who participated was promoted at least one rank, and medals were awarded to all. Upon rushing back to Washington, Vice Admiral Nimitz was whisked straight from the airport to the White House, where his promotion ceremony took place. Under the gaze of White House officials and staff, the President of the United States—the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces by law—personally handed the insignia of Admiral to the naval commander.
Initially, White House staff had considered having President Roosevelt personally pin the new rank insignia on Admiral Nimitz. However, given President Roosevelt’s physical disability and inability to stand, Nimitz would have had to kneel on the floor—much like a general receiving a promotion from an emperor—for Roosevelt to reach him. The idea was dropped.
Once the promotion ceremony concluded, the gathered spectators applauded enthusiastically. Admiral Nimitz managed only a polite, squeezed-out smile; he had not come to Washington to preen before the public or bask in glory. Fortunately, the people inside the White House were astute; they quickly cleared the room to allow the Admiral and the President time to talk.
When only a few key officials remained in the Oval Office, Admiral Nimitz voiced his concerns with striking candor. "Mr. President, according to our assessments, the U.S. Navy currently requires at least fifty aircraft carriers capable of matching their Chinese counterparts..."
Roosevelt showed no surprise, simply listening quietly. Other naval officials had already hinted at similar views through various channels; Nimitz was clearly taking on the role of formally presenting these demands.
Nimitz was well aware of his role, and he was willing to play it. When the President began asking specific questions, the Admiral pulled documents from his briefcase. The President and his key officials gathered around the blueprints as Nimitz analyzed the current situation.
The blueprints displayed China's active carriers alongside America's most advanced *Essex*-class carriers. The difference in their silhouettes was stark. The American *Essex*-class featured the standard rectangular deck, while the Chinese carriers possessed an angled flight deck extending from the rear of the main deck for aircraft recovery. American fighter pilots had been deeply impressed by this landing layout; the flight deck allowed Chinese carriers to launch and recover aircraft simultaneously, boosting their combat efficiency to nearly double that of American carriers.
After outlining the equipment and quantities the U.S. military currently needed, Nimitz did not conceal his perspective. "Mr. President, I believe the United States will face immense pressure in the Pacific in the current phase."
Roosevelt was not displeased by this ominous prediction. Nimitz was merely stating publicly what some of Roosevelt’s true confidants had already concluded in private. The American upper echelon had already acknowledged that China's industrial capacity was in no way inferior to that of the United States. Furthermore, China's supply lines were far shorter. Whether dispatching fleets or providing logistical support to the Pacific theater, China enjoyed a significant advantage over the U.S. Damaged Chinese warships could return to shipyards for major repairs within a month, whereas the United States required more than double that time.
Comparing the two, China's cost of sustaining the war was far lower than America's. According to the most unfavorable assessments, China's cost to maintain the Pacific War was only half that of the United States. Given that China's industrial strength matched America's, and their military spending was roughly equivalent, the other half of their war chest allowed China to act with impunity in the Indian Ocean.
The United States was already straining every nerve in the Pacific and had no spare capacity to project significant power into the Indian Ocean. The British forces, who were supposed to be holding the line against China there, had suffered a string of shameful defeats. The most recent and humiliating of these involved 100,000 white troops from the British homeland failing to take a city defended by less than 30,000 local Indian insurgents.
The British had offered an explanation for this. The 20,000-strong rabble of Indian locals inside Mumbai was not the issue; the reason the 100,000 British troops couldn't breach the city was entirely because they were being bombed by thousands of Chinese fighter sorties every day. They were simply too busy trying to survive.
The United States could empathize with Britain's pain, as American forces frequently engaged hundreds, if not thousands, of Chinese fighters. If not for the fact that American industrial strength was sufficient to rival China's, the U.S. military would have collapsed long ago.
Roosevelt did not touch upon specific tactical issues; that was not his responsibility. instead, he laid out the requirements from a strategic level. "General, for the current phase, we must hold the line. We must buy time for the coming counteroffensive."
"Mr. President, to hold the line at this stage, we must rely on a greater volume of equipment to counter the Chinese offensive," Nimitz replied. The United States had begun comprehensive war preparations in 1938. According to the plan, by 1943, the U.S. Navy was to have over forty-eight large aircraft carriers and 100,000 combat aircraft. The preparations had been truly thorough, but China's preparations were evidently even more so. The U.S. military was finding it difficult to counter China's aviation advantage.
Roosevelt looked toward his Special Assistant, known as the "Shadow President." The assistant immediately spoke up: "There are currently six carriers on the verge of commissioning. Within three months at most, our carrier count will reach thirty-six. By June 1943, we can reach forty-eight."
Nimitz had no desire to deceive anyone, so he responded, "Mr. President, I now find myself in strong agreement with General MacArthur's view. China's campaign objective is not to defeat our military in a decisive battle, but to consume us. Our logistical strain places us at a disadvantage in a war of attrition. If we cannot field double China's equipment in a short time, could we perhaps provide a large number of submarines to sever China's shipping lanes and weaken their logistical advantage?"
Roosevelt neither opposed nor endorsed Nimitz's request. Instead, he continued to press on whether the U.S. military could hold the line. Roosevelt was responsible for strategy. As long as the strategy was correct, the loss of an army group, or the loss of several—or even a dozen—carrier battle groups, could be remedied by producing more equipment and drafting and training more troops to throw into the grinder.
But once the strategy failed, no amount of equipment or personnel thrown in would matter. History offered no precedent of reversing a strategic defeat through tactical victories. For Europeans and Americans, they rarely cited the Chu-Han Contention, preferring instead the example of Hannibal.
Hannibal had won numerous classic battles that were passed down through history; the Battle of Cannae was the dream of every general. Yet, that single victory did not reverse Carthage's fate. Rome, on the contrary, grew stronger as it fought, eventually annihilating Carthage.
Based on the disparity of power between China and the U.S. revealed by the war, Roosevelt and his core team of advisors had already determined America's subsequent strategy: integrate Europe's industrial capacity and first withstand China's offensive. Once China showed signs of fatigue, a total counteroffensive would begin. Therefore, at this stage, the U.S. military absolutely could not be driven out of the Pacific. Regardless of the cost, they had to hold.
During the conversation, Roosevelt judged that Nimitz understood this strategy and was indeed thinking along its lines. However, Nimitz's assessment of the battle situation appeared rather pessimistic. Listening to Nimitz, it sounded as if there was a high probability the U.S. military would not be able to withstand China's attacks in the current phase.
There was no issue with Nimitz's competence, yet Roosevelt began to consider whether a change of command was needed. The White House knew China's offensive was incredibly sharp; right now, the White House needed a general capable of holding off the Chinese attack at any cost. Every shipyard in Europe and America was full, with shipbuilding capacity stretched to its limit.
In various American shipyards and naval research institutes, designs for American carriers modeled after the new Chinese carriers were nearly complete. Within a year at most, new American carriers would be launched. What the White House needed now was time, and a general who could win that time for the White House.
Roosevelt asked, "General, if you are in command, how long can the U.S. military hold?"
Nimitz answered frankly, "Mr. President, if it is merely a matter of holding Hawaii, I can guarantee holding it for nine months."
Roosevelt said nothing more. Although he knew the U.S. would certainly lose quite a few islands in the coming campaigns, the level of performance Nimitz could promise was far from what Roosevelt expected. Without continuing the discussion, Roosevelt ended the meeting. Once Nimitz had left, Roosevelt asked the Chief of Naval Operations, "Are there any other candidates?"
The Chief of Naval Operations had no desire to mislead Roosevelt. Nimitz's judgment was not made in isolation; it was the shared view of many outstanding officers within the Navy. The worst problem the U.S. military faced at this stage was that the U.S. wanted to win the war by defeating China, while China wanted to win the war by exhausting the United States.
Before the war broke out, the United States truly did not believe China had the capacity to stand against the powerful U.S. for long. The Chief of Naval Operations was unwilling to say it aloud, but in his heart, he had already admitted that on the strategic level, the United States seemed to have truly fallen to a disadvantage.