"Chairman, do you mean that regarding the vacuum tube computers, we shouldn't actively inform the French, nor should we treat it as strictly classified?" Li Chenggang, fearing he had misunderstood He Rui's intent, sought confirmation again.

"...More or less." He Rui didn't sound entirely confident when he said this.

Li Chenggang rarely saw He Rui answer questions with such hesitation; usually, He Rui was crisp and decisive in his strategic judgments. He couldn't help but press, "Why?"

"In principle, the vacuum tube computer is a device that Europe and America could also achieve at their current stage. However, in terms of effective calculation, the computer constitutes a 'National Heavy Weapon.' Effective calculation capacity has always been a massive source of competitiveness. During the Opium War era, the number of engineers in Britain was fewer than the number of skilled craftsmen in China. Why was the gap between the two sides so immense? Because the effective calculation volume British engineers applied to technological iteration was far higher than that of the Qing Dynasty. The calculation volume generated by engineers based on scientific and technical principles forms the foundation of technological iteration, and vacuum tube computers are currently providing this calculation volume for Chinese engineering. So, even though I know technological diffusion is impossible to stop, from a technical perspective, I still don't want foreign nations to understand the equipment China possesses this early."

Li Chenggang felt he could understand He Rui's hesitation perfectly. Upon learning that French engineers had noticed the 'calculation capacity' of Chinese engineers, Li Chenggang felt that they must not let the French engineers learn about China's vacuum tube computers. China's industrial technology base was weak; if they had to attempt every feasible technical route one by one, it would require vast amounts of time and money. Thus, using calculation to conduct comparisons had become the preferred method for various design bureaus.

Vacuum tube computers happened to provide the computing power needed for massive amounts of tedious calculations. The numerous production lines introduced from France had precisely verified that many of the technical directions China had derived were correct. The fact that China couldn't realize some technical directions even after calculating them was only because China's weak industrial level couldn't meet the needs of certain intermediate technical links and equipment. Li Chenggang intuitively felt that China's possession of vacuum tube computers was a major advantage.

At this moment, almost all the vacuum tube computers across the country—those not down for maintenance—were running. France had provided too many blueprints and technical documents. To digest and absorb these technical materials as quickly as possible, China's technical teams not only had to copy the manufacturing processes provided by France but also had to conduct theoretical verification on them through data calculation.

Of the thousands of computers, one-tenth belonged to the military. A portion of these computers was calculating data related to the submarine materials provided by Germany, while data completed by a small number of computers had already been aggregated to become part of the data support for the operational plan to liberate Northern Korea.

The General Staff had handed the work of formulating the operational plan to Lieutenant General Yu Cen. Lieutenant General Yu Cen presented the content of the first phase of the operational plan to Defense Minister Cheng Ruofan, Chief of General Staff Hu Xiushan, and Logistics Minister Zhong Yifu.

From a purely operational planning perspective, General Hu Xiushan, Chief of the General Staff, felt there were no issues with Lieutenant General Yu Cen's plan. However, Hu Xiushan noticed a thoughtful look on Cheng Ruofan's face, realizing Cheng Ruofan was not satisfied. Once the report concluded, Cheng Ruofan directly stated his view: "At this stage, what matters is the composition of the Korean Restoration Army. We certainly hope young Korean communists can become the leaders and implement a socialist system in Korea. But this plan does not propose a solution for whether the Korean landlord class and the old aristocracy will stand on Japan's side because of this."

Hu Xiushan asked, "Could we refer this matter to the Chairman for arrangement?"

Cheng Ruofan looked at Zhong Yifu. Zhong Yifu thought for a moment and replied, "I think we can ask the Chairman who should be responsible for this matter, and whether the responsible department can fully cooperate with the Ministry of National Defense."

This was a fairly compromise solution. Although Cheng Ruofan very much wanted the army's Political Department to take charge, he acknowledged that Zhong Yifu's line of thinking was very correct. A call was made, ostensibly to report to He Rui. He Rui, however, asked directly, "Are there any problems with it?"

Cheng Ruofan immediately explained the issue to He Rui. He thought He Rui would ponder it for a while after listening, but unexpectedly, He Rui immediately offered a direction for the solution. "Take the 38th parallel north latitude as the temporary demarcation line. Our objective for now is to occupy Northern Korea."

The others saw Cheng Ruofan's eyebrows raise and his eyes brighten. Although they knew He Rui must have proposed an excellent idea, they couldn't hear it immediately. Everyone's eyes were fixed on Cheng Ruofan. When Cheng Ruofan put down the phone, Zhong Yifu immediately asked, "What does the Chairman think?"

Cheng Ruofan chose his words carefully and replied, "The Chairman believes our plan to target the entirety of Korea is impractical. He requires us to use the 38th parallel as the demarcation line first, making the control of half of Korea our objective."

Hu Xiushan and the others immediately felt that He Rui's thinking was indeed very forward-looking. This wasn't about mandating what Korea must become, but rather, He Rui's approach solved the problem of what Korea *could not* become.

Cheng Ruofan organized his thoughts and said slowly, "By doing this, the Chairman allows the Korean landlords and such to flee to Southern Korea first. And the landlord class in Southern Korea will also have time to think."

"Regarding the landlords, can't we just fight our way through?" Hu Xiushan asked. This line of thought was correct, yet also not quite correct. According to intelligence, among the landlords in East Asia, those in Korea were the most conservative and backward. Japan at least had some industry; Korea's industrial scale was not large, fundamentally insufficient to change Korea's nature as an agricultural region. Splitting Korea in two would give the Korean landlords a period of time.

Hu Xiushan was very experienced in formulating operational plans, but he never considered analyzing class attributes and designating political policies based on those attributes to be his strong suit. However, this self-awareness didn't make Hu Xiushan stay silent on areas he didn't understand. He asked, "In that case, wouldn't that turn Southern Korea into the base camp for Korean landlords?"

Cheng Ruofan explained slowly, "The proportion of landlords in Korea is still very low. Northern Korea will become a model for Korea in terms of land policy, allowing Southern Korea to see that a future Korea won't be a world where they can't survive. And can't the Korean landlords who truly find it completely unacceptable flee to Japan?"

Hearing Cheng Ruofan's explanation, Hu Xiushan still felt something was off, so he said, "Why don't we ask the Chairman to explain his opinion to us?"

Just as Cheng Ruofan was about to agree, Zhong Yifu said, "If we do that, we might as well produce the operational plan first, and take the questions to the Chairman then."

Cheng Ruofan immediately agreed with this idea. "Our previous operational plan was overly complex. At this stage, occupying only half of Korea reduces the difficulty significantly. There is only one key point to modify, which is that we can consider cooperation from the Japanese side."

Yu Cen listened seriously to the opinions of Cheng Ruofan and the others, agreeing strongly with Cheng Ruofan's view. If Japan agreed to the 38th parallel as a temporary dividing line, they could indeed consider obtaining cooperation from the Japanese side. Although Yu Cen felt this idea was bold, after commanding the war in Burma, Yu Cen was completely convinced by He Rui's political arrangements. Before learning that Britain was actually negotiating with China, Yu Cen had found it hard to imagine how the British Empire could accept reasons for peace talks with China. But that reason had indeed appeared! And it had resulted in the three joint communiqués between China and Britain.

At this time, the Sino-Japanese negotiations had reached their conclusion. The Japanese delegation reported the negotiated content to the Japanese cabinet. Many members of the Ishiwara Cabinet were of military background; hearing that China actually wanted Korean independence, their expressions turned grim.

Ishiwara Kanji then stood up and said, "Gentlemen, if Korea becomes independent, it is not without benefits for Japan. The greatest benefit lies in the fact that there will be no direct point of conflict between China and Japan. With the current border between China and Japan, the armies on both sides are very uneasy about each other's presence. If this situation continues, an accidental discharge leading to war is not an unfounded fear."

Someone immediately objected, "Why isn't this an issue between China and Russia? Their border is nearly ten thousand kilometers long!"

Ishiwara explained patiently, "Because the strategic directions of China and Russia are different. Russia's highest priority strategic direction is in Central and Eastern Europe. China's most important strategic direction at this stage should have been the south, but bordering Japan forces China to place a major strategic focus on Japan."

Once this was said, some Japanese cabinet members understood, while others remained confused. Those who understood were largely those with high-ranking military backgrounds. Ishiwara continued to explain to the cabinet members who hadn't figured it out yet: "Where lies Japan's interest in occupying Korea? If we were to grant Koreans Japanese citizenship and make it completely part of the Japanese homeland, I would join you gentlemen in demanding of China that Korea is an inseparable part of Japan! I wonder if you gentlemen recognize Koreans as Japanese?"

No one answered. Many Japanese cabinet members lowered their gaze to avoid awkwardness. In current Japanese public opinion, neither Koreans nor Taiwanese were considered Japanese; even the Ryukyuans, annexed by Japan for half a century, were not treated as true Japanese.

This was indeed the will of the Japanese people. Even statesmen of the cabinet member level, knowing full well the necessity of granting national treatment to Korea and Taiwan, did not view the populations of these two places as true Japanese.

Seeing that the cabinet members were unwilling to face the core challenge—that is, the challenge of identity—Ishiwara struck while the iron was hot. "China does not consider Koreans to be Chinese either, so they do not seek to annex Korea. But the Chinese consider Taiwanese to be Chinese. As long as Taiwanese pass China's various examinations, they can serve as Chinese officials. Even serve as China's Premier or Chairman. What China cares about is these people's ability, not their provincial origin. If a Ryukyuan became a Governor of a province, or even the Premier of the Cabinet, I wonder how you gentlemen would view it?"

Hearing Ishiwara's hypothesis, the same thought immediately popped into the minds of the Japanese cabinet members: *'The nation would no longer be a nation.'*