Heydrich's report on Poland caused Hitler's unease to subside somewhat. After Heydrich left, Hitler once again turned his attention to the map of Europe. Since the map only covered the regions he intended to occupy, the detestable Chinese sphere of influence did not appear on it.

The Soviet Union's three major cities—Saint Petersburg (Leningrad) and Moscow—were within the German army's offensive range. Stalingrad was already under German control. In the summer offensive launched in 1943, Manstein had been appointed commander of Army Group North, which had already advanced to within 120 kilometers of Saint Petersburg.

Army Group Center was commanded by Field Marshal von Bock. On this front, where both the Soviets and Germans had committed massive forces, the Red Army was suffering constant defeats.

The southern front was commanded by Colonel General Paulus. Initially, Hitler had believed that after taking Stalingrad, they could strike south in one move to seize the Baku oil fields. However, reality had taught Hitler that he had been too presumptuous. Even when Reichenau was alive, the Red Army had not collapsed after the fall of Stalingrad but instead continued to organize resistance based on the terrain.

Although extremely unwilling, Hitler had to admit that the plan to sweep through the southern Soviet Union had to be postponed. Thus, Paulus—calm, composed, thoughtful, and strategically minded—was demonstrating excellent combat capability on the southern front.

Stalin remained desperate to retake Stalingrad and was launching constant counter-attacks. The Army Group South under Paulus met these challenges calmly, repeatedly crushing the Red Army's counter-offensives at a low cost, achieving high casualty ratios and continuously wearing down the Soviet forces.

If one were to look only at the war between Germany and the Soviet Union, the German army was likely to win in 1943. But viewed from a global perspective, it was a different story.

The Chinese military had already compressed the Allies into North America, Western Europe, and Western Africa, and was continuing to shrink their controlled zones. If China's progress continued at this rate, the Allies would likely be confined to North America and Western Europe by the end of 1943.

Hitler believed there was only one way to break this situation: for Germany to thoroughly defeat the Soviet Union and take control of its European portion.

"Call Ribbentrop," Hitler ordered.

Soon, Nazi Germany's Foreign Minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, appeared before Hitler. Hitler asked: "Ribbentrop, how do you think the Allies should respond to the current situation?"

Ribbentrop immediately stood straight and replied: "We should start with the enemy's weakest link. The Soviet Union is the weakest link. The Allies should tilt their resources toward Germany to help us drive the Soviets east of the Urals in '43. Germany could then swing its armies south, rendering China unable to attack Europe. This would solve the Allies' predicament."

Hitler had always appreciated Ribbentrop's strategic intuition. Seeing that Ribbentrop's views aligned with his own, Hitler immediately told him: "I want you to visit the United States and explain Germany's strategic thinking to the Roosevelt government."

Ribbentrop replied at once: "I will do everything in my power to persuade them."

This was not Ribbentrop merely flattering Hitler. To date, Germany's war supply situation was decent. The United States possessed vast resources and was selling large amounts of raw materials and supplies to the Allies. The German economy, having purchased these supplies, was running quite well and achieving significant success in the war against the USSR.

Ribbentrop was very clear about his goal: to get the United States to sell even more supplies to satisfy Germany's full-scale offensive in 1943.

On July 13th, Ribbentrop arrived in Washington. Secretary of State Hull met him at the airport. As the car passed through the streets of Washington, Ribbentrop instinctively felt a sense of depression in the air.

At this time, China and the U.S. were engaged in fierce combat on the North American west coast. Washington, being on the East Coast and thousands of kilometers away, shouldn't have been so affected in theory. But Ribbentrop had personally seen the changes in German cities before, during, and after the outbreak of war. Having remained at the center of Nazi power, he had access to a vast amount of high-level information. The subtle phenomena he had seen in German cities were now appearing in the American capital.

From the street scenes visible outside the car window, the number of young men of military age was noticeably low. Middle-aged workers over 40 had become the primary social workforce. As in Germany, the number of female workers in uniforms was clearly increasing, and these women formed their own groups when traveling, making them particularly conspicuous.

With the experience of the 1942 winter defensive battles, the German army believed they could continue to deal heavy blows to the Soviets in winter. The German high command was prepared for a total mobilization in 1943, expanding the army to 11 million men. This had led to a massive labor gap in Germany, which naturally had to be filled by women.

To maintain social stability, the husbands at the front had to be convinced that their wives-turned-workers would not be unfaithful. Female workers had to be organized into internal organizations that kept men away.

The Nazi government had long ago organized social groups like the Women's League, which were functioning well. On the streets of Washington, Ribbentrop also saw posters for similar organizations.

In addition to posters for women's organizations and U.S. military recruitment, Ribbentrop saw posters for nurse recruitment—all quite new. It was evident that American war losses had reached a point where existing medical personnel were insufficient. The U.S. government was forced to "embrace the Buddha's feet" and conduct emergency recruitment.

Secretary of State Hull could likely guess the purpose of the Nazi German mission. Sure enough, soon after arriving at his hotel, Ribbentrop held a meeting with Hull and proposed that the U.S. increase the supply of war resources to Germany.

The Roosevelt cabinet had already seriously discussed the current situation. Some believed Germany should break the stalemate to draw Chinese strength toward Europe. The German army was valiant; if they could strike into the Middle East and open an Asian front in reverse, it should consume Chinese power.

Therefore, Hull posed a question to Ribbentrop: "Mr. Minister, do you believe Germany is capable of occupying India?"

Ribbentrop did not answer immediately. Before his visit, he and Foreign Office staff had analyzed potential questions. Hull's question was among them. Ribbentrop believed that among the senior German generals, the one with the most strategic vision was Manstein. Thus, through Hitler, a portion of the war-related questions had been given to Manstein for his answers, to serve as a reference for this diplomatic mission.

Manstein believed that Germany might be able to occupy the western part of India, but doing so would be useless. Never mind western India—even occupying the entire subcontinent would not shake China's strategy.

Seeing that Hull had no other questions for the moment, Ribbentrop replied: "Does the United States believe that China's strategic core is controlling colonies?"

This response gave Hull some pause. The U.S. Joint Chiefs had also analyzed and judged the prospect of supporting Germany. Douglas MacArthur, who was now effectively in a leadership role within the Joint Chiefs, had stated: "The greatest threat to the Allies comes from the sea. As long as the Chinese Navy continues to possess such a massive advantage, even losing India won't stop China from maintaining its current offensive.

"If we want to truly turn the tide, the fundamental requirement is to get the Soviet Union to choose neutrality. As long as the USSR is neutral, China, even if it doesn't commit a vast army to guard against the Soviets, will have to maintain the current scale of the war alone. At that time, several million elite German troops could exert their combat power in Southern Europe."

From a strategic perspective, Hull agreed with MacArthur. But at this stage, to get the Soviet Union to be neutral, Germany would have to make massive concessions. And for Germany to make such concessions, the United States would have to pay a massive price. Hull very much wanted to complete this task but found his own ability seemingly insufficient.

But the situation being what it was, Hull had to put forward the American view: "If the Soviet Union agreed to withdraw from the war, what would Germany want in return?"

Hearing this question, Ribbentrop's admiration for Manstein increased further. To date, Manstein differed from other senior German generals in that he dared to voice his own thoughts.

In that questionnaire, Manstein had provided an answer to the question "How to respond to the Chinese offensive": force the Soviet Union out of the war so the German army would have the capacity to deal with the Chinese.

To achieve this goal, Manstein believed a two-pronged approach was best: capture Saint Petersburg and Moscow, dealing a crushing blow to the Red Army in the process, then force the USSR out of the war by establishing buffer states to resolve the threat to Germany's east.

Once the Soviet Union withdrew, a weakened USSR would likely become a target for China. The Soviet Union joining the Allied camp would undoubtedly be a major boon for the Allies.

Even if the He Rui government possessed enough strategic resolve to refrain from attacking the USSR, the Soviet Union could not possibly become an assistant to China in the short term. At that point, the strength gap between the Allies and China would narrow significantly, rendering a two-front China no longer so overwhelmingly advantaged.

As for Germany, it could fully integrate the resources of Northern and Central Europe to prepare for the subsequent war with China.

With the logic provided by the strategist Manstein, Ribbentrop believed he understood Hull's view and asked with a skeptical tone and expression: "Does the United States already have some agreement with the Soviet Union?"

As a member of the Allies, a private U.S. agreement with the USSR would be a scandal. Hull immediately denied it: "The United States has no agreement with the Soviet Union."

However, given the current state of the war, the Roosevelt government had to push the situation in a direction favorable to the U.S. Hull continued: "The United States still believes it is necessary to unite the white world to meet the current crisis."

"Germany is very much looking forward to the white world uniting. But German interests cannot be sacrificed for the sake of that unity."

"And what does Germany consider its interests to be at this stage?"

"Germany needs a supply of raw materials. Simultaneously, Germany needs security in the East. If Germany cannot obtain security in the East through diplomacy, Germany must ensure it for itself." Ribbentrop's voice was loud, and his expression and tone were severe.

Secretary Hull, however, felt his mood brighten instantly. For in the logic provided by the Joint Chiefs, they had also identified Germany's needs. If Germany's goal was to ensure security in the East, the American side believed there was still room for negotiation with the Soviet Union.

The worst-case scenario at present was Germany wanting to occupy Soviet territory with the current front line as the new border. As long as Germany agreed to retreat to the pre-war lines, the U.S. would have space to communicate with the USSR.

After all, although the U.S. Embassy had been withdrawn from the Soviet Union, the U.S. had still not declared war on them. There was still room for negotiation.

After a few more exchanges, Ribbentrop was extremely firm in other areas, besides expressing that Germany had not closed the door to peace with the Soviets.

Seeing no immediate progress in the talks, Hull rose to take his leave. "Please rest well, Minister Ribbentrop. We will arrange further meetings as soon as possible."

Soon, Hull went to see Roosevelt and informed him of the meeting's content. Roosevelt pondered for a long time after hearing it, then posed a question to Hull: "Is Ribbentrop truly not the madman of legend?"

Hull knew this question was vital. Ribbentrop had a terrible reputation in the Western world, considered a man full of lies who excelled at deceiving Western nations—and a fanatical Nazi racist to boot.

If it were confirmed that Ribbentrop was not a madman, it meant he had to be treated like a rational, normal person. In that case, the United States would have to engage in serious discussion with him to arrive at a solution favorable to the Allies, and especially to the U.S.

Hull finally replied with difficulty: "Perhaps Ribbentrop himself is not truly a madman. It is just that his ideology is too insane."

This answer kicked the ball back to Roosevelt. Roosevelt understood Hull's meaning: believing Ribbentrop was not the same as believing Nazi Germany. Even if Ribbentrop were persuaded, there were many more true madmen on the Nazi side, and what those Nazi fanatics might do was something the U.S. could not be certain of.

Yet Roosevelt also faced an extremely difficult situation. Convincing the Soviet Union to withdraw from the war would be incredibly hard; if Stalin still wanted to salvage his sunk costs, the USSR could choose to follow China and continue the war. Over the past nearly 30 years, He Rui's ability to grasp grand strategy had left a deep impression on Roosevelt.

In terms of self-restraint, patience, and waiting for opportunity, He Rui was more cunning and resilient than a 70-year-old veteran politician. In meeting the reasonable demands of allies, He Rui possessed the generosity and bottom line of a 50-year-old statesman. And in seizing strategic opportunities, He Rui had the sharpness, delicacy, and forward-momentum of a 30-year-old.

America's current windows of opportunity were few, and they could not afford any delay, for the war on the North American west coast was raging with extreme ferocity. Roosevelt intuitively sensed a massive crisis.

Roosevelt couldn't help but vent to Hull: "Hull, I feel the Chinese have become madmen under excessive stimulation. But I must say, perhaps during the Boxer Rebellion, the Western world was too arrogant. That arrogance undoubtedly convinced the Chinese people that the West was hostile toward them. That is how He Rui was able to convince his people that only by thoroughly defeating the Western world could China obtain true security."

Hull agreed wholeheartedly and sighed: "The Qing was a truly open and inclusive nation; under its rule, China was willing to reach a truly peaceful and stable relationship with the world. But Western politicians were short-sighted and greedy; for their own political gain, they proposed many foolish conditions, creating a misunderstanding among the Chinese people toward the West.

"Furthermore, afterward, the West did not recognize the terror of this misunderstanding. Although the insulting clauses were effectively canceled, they were not actively promoted in China, leading to a deepening of the misunderstanding. He Rui then fully exploited this.

"If the United States had proactively canceled the Chinese Exclusion Act instead of doing so under the political offensive launched by He Rui, the situation would be entirely different."

Roosevelt knew that was actually impossible. It was only in hindsight that the U.S. had clearly missed a vast number of opportunities—opportunities that would have allowed the U.S. to gain massive benefits through cooperation with China. But things had reached this point, and Roosevelt had no other way.

Nevertheless, Roosevelt made a request: "Hull, from now on, I will not inquire into your communications with China."

Hull was taken aback. He knew that Roosevelt was now truly thinking of exiting the war. 州。