**Chapter 872: Cute Stalin (9)**

Kirov hadn't originally intended to praise China, as the most important thing for the Soviet Union at this stage was stability; the introduction of a more advanced model could potentially disrupt that stability. However, his working meeting with Malyshev necessitated a discussion of China's advanced state. If not for the urgent need to enhance the Soviet Union's own strength, Kirov would have been reluctant to do so.

Malyshev's professional perspective on China offered Kirov significant insights. After some reflection, Kirov asked, "Comrade Commissioner, do you believe Chinese vacuum-tube computers were put into large-scale practical use as early as 1926 rather than 1928?"

Malyshev answered without hesitation, "Yes. Developing vacuum-tube computers takes time, and I do not believe China would provide us with their most advanced technology. The tech we received is likely two to four years behind theirs. Judging by what we have, China has already accumulated a vast number of calculation models. Establishing these models requires a massive amount of specialized mathematical talent. According to our Academy of Sciences, completing these models would take around 3,000 scientists over ten years of research and accumulation. By calculation, China must have begun its research into computer applications by 1926.

This also aligns with our assessment of China's technical personnel numbers. Their scientific system construction began in the Northeast in 1916; by 1924, China was graduating around 40,000 university students annually. These graduates would need two to five years of work experience to shoulder the burden of industry R&D. China only began large-scale cooperation with France in 1928. This overlap in timing creates the illusion that Chinese development is entirely based on French technology.

If we assume China began large-scale use of computers for assisted calculation in 1926, we find a logical explanation for their current technological level. Industrial development in all nations is built step-by-step on accumulated data—it is true for us, and for the West.

As you said, Commissioner Kirov, computers effectively help decision-makers obtain solutions based on massive data. China must have utilized the vast amounts of data provided by computers to derive and execute more valuable plans. This is what allowed China to achieve its current results in such a short time."

The more Kirov heard, the more surprised he became. He had made his judgment based on personal experience, while Malyshev was analyzing the application and results from the perspective of an implementation specialist.

The expert analysis not only gave Kirov a sense of enlightenment but provided a more solid foundation for his vision of future reforms to the Stalinist system.

Kirov had long been convinced that he must transform Stalin's autocratic model. Yet the greatest benefit of that model was its ability to solve problems effectively. If Kirov changed it only to lower national efficiency, it would be better not to reform at all.

If computer assistance could provide more precise data and effective solutions, Kirov could adopt more moderate means to manage the nation once he received power from Stalin.

After a moment's thought, Kirov set aside the unanswered questions and raised another matter: "Commissioner Malyshev, what is your evaluation of *On Protracted War*?"

Though he didn't say it publicly, Kirov was seriously studying Li Runshi's *On Protracted War*, trying to understand his strategic views. He hoped the people he chose would also have a deep understanding of it.

Malyshev decided to align himself with Kirov and answered the tricky question truthfully: "Commissioner Kirov, I believe *On Protracted War* is a strategically highly condensed paper. Its core is sound, but in execution, effectively judging which operational model to use places extremely high demands on the command structure.

Given the current situation, many of the tactics in *On Protracted War* are not suited for the Russian winter. Our tactics, though monotonous, are relatively effective. Rapidly enhancing our tactical capability will take time, and we currently lack the time to build more complete training models."

After hearing Malyshev's evaluation, Kirov decided he was an outstanding talent who had to be brought into his circle. He then asked Malyshev for his views on personnel for the Computer Industry Commissariat. Malyshev, recognizing the opportunity, immediately recommended several people. He also made a request: "Commissioner Kirov, I believe the members of the Computer Industry Commissariat should engage in full exchange with the personnel of the Tank Industry Commissariat."

Kirov nodded. Full exchange was beneficial for training, but from a Soviet political perspective, it meant that once the war ended and military production was scaled back, members of the Tank Industry Commissariat could transition seamlessly into the Computer Industry Commissariat.

Only if Kirov guaranteed the future of the tank industry comrades would they be loyal to him. Kirov had already decided to take the Tank Industry Commissariat—responsible for all Soviet military production—under his wing.

For now, Kirov could only build his team one supporter at a time. Therefore, he offered no views on Stalin's policy execution.

Stalin, meanwhile, was constantly making demands of the General Staff. Ignoring troop density and logistics, several encirclements had been completed on paper. Furthermore, the Germans were also facing logistical difficulties and severe damage to their combat effectiveness from the prolonged fighting. Thus, during this period of direct command, Stalin was hearing a constant stream of good news. This greatly increased his confidence in himself and his trusted old comrades.

On January 8, 1943, Stalin finally received the news he had long awaited: the encirclement of the German 16th Army had been realized. The participating Soviet forces included the Northwestern Front (11th and 34th Armies) and the Kalinin Front (3rd and 4th Shock Armies). The two fronts totaled approximately 230,000 men, equipped with over 300 tanks and 1,000 guns.

The encircled German 16th Army numbered about 120,000—roughly half the size of the encircling Soviet force. Furthermore, the Red Army had destroyed the railway lines the Germans relied on, leaving their logistics severely depleted.

Stalin was overjoyed. Annihilating 120,000 Germans would provide a massive boost to Red Army morale. Moreover, with the Wehrmacht under heavy pressure along the entire front, they couldn't possibly spare enough units to relieve the 16th Army.

But the General Staff was not so optimistic. This was the largest German concentration trapped in an encirclement since the start of the war. The Soviets were far from prepared to handle so many Germans and found it psychologically difficult to accept all at once. To devour such a powerful force in one go was, in their eyes, impossible.

The elite Germans in the pocket were not like the raw recruits the Soviets often threw into battle. They were highly trained, battle-hardened veterans, including about 20,000 tenacious SS troops wearing winter gear recently sent from the Riga station—most of it stripped from Jews. With ample communication equipment, the Germans could effectively direct these units to conduct stubborn resistance from strongpoints, avoiding the rapid disintegration the Soviets suffered when their communications were cut. Moreover, the Soviets lacked the capability for further flanking and infiltration, especially lacking sufficient armored groups to split and annihilate the Germans.

But Stalin gave the General Staff no choice, ordering Zhukov—who was commanding operations in the north—"Resolutely annihilate the encircled German forces!"

After sending the telegram, Stalin felt highly displeased. This battle proved Zhukov's ability. Initially, Zhukov had ordered airborne drops, but they had performed poorly due to logistical failures, improper command, and a lack of heavy weapons.

Yet on January 1st, the Red Army had committed airborne units deep into the German positions to disrupt their defense. The 2nd Guards Rifle Corps, attacking from Staraya Russa, had driven deep into the nearly undefended German rear, encircling about 5,000 Germans. While those Germans were surrounded at Kholm, a larger encirclement was forming.

At the time, the Germans had reinforced their defense with four reserve divisions, stalling the Soviet advance. On January 5th, another fresh Soviet unit—the 1st Guards Rifle Corps attacking from the north toward Ramushevo—linked up with the 42nd Rifle Brigade of the 34th Army from the south, north of Zaluchye. Behind them, the German II Corps (under General von Brockdorff-Ahlefeldt) and part of General Hansen's X Corps were trapped in a pocket near Demyansk about 60 kilometers long and 30 kilometers wide. In this campaign, the Soviets advanced over 250 kilometers toward Vitebsk, bypassing the Demyansk group of the 16th Army from the south. Approximately 120,000 men of the German 16th Army's II and X Corps were surrounded in the Demyansk region.

This series of interlocking encirclements had been proposed by Stalin and resisted by the General Staff. Now Stalin hoped Zhukov would fight this battle well to boost morale. Annihilating 120,000 Germans meant the Red Army could annihilate even more.

The Germans naturally did not want their heavy concentration destroyed. On January 9th, Manstein, former Chief of Staff of Army Group South, was ordered to the north to take direct command of the encircled 16th Army.

As soon as he reached headquarters, Manstein began reviewing the reports. They showed that the Red Army was using a model of continuously committing troops into the offensive to maintain the encirclement. This resulted in a very "dynamic" ring; a road surrounded today might not be tomorrow.

The Soviets were unable to maintain a "ring of steel," which reassured Manstein. However, this dynamic nature was because the Germans were constantly engaging the Soviets and defeating their units, forcing the Red Army to constantly replace the encircling forces. Once the Wehrmacht lost the ability to continuously defeat the Soviets in winter, the dynamic ring would quickly become a solid one.

Having identified the cause of the situation, Manstein immediately investigated which German units were capable of dealing the Red Army heavy blows. This was easy to determine: the 16th Army currently comprised the II and VI Infantry Corps, including the 12th, 30th, 32nd, 123rd, and 290th Infantry Divisions, the SS "Totenkopf" Motorized Division, "Eicke" Group, and "Arko" Group, with a total strength of about 120,000.

To Manstein's surprise, among the units capable of sustained combat in the freezing northern Soviet Union, the Waffen-SS ranked at the very top.

At the mention of the SS, Manstein furrowed his brow. He had dealt with them during the Polish campaign. Back then, they had the courage for war, but they preferred murdering civilians and Jews. Those actions satisfied the racial ideology they had been fed.

Nazi Germany's political philosophy was built on racism, with Germans as the superior race. Slavs like the Poles were inferior, and Jews even more so.

The Waffen-SS believed firmly in this theory, yet in Germany, they had no opportunity to practice it through killing. Once in another country, they naturally resorted to slaughter to "clarify their thoughts."

After reading the reports, Manstein didn't particularly believe these men, immersed in their own world, could possess sufficient combat capability. So while demanding more reports from his staff, he also issued operational orders to the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf," which had performed most prominently. He ordered them to hold the lines in the Demyansk sector most likely to face a Soviet assault.

After sending the order, Manstein worried the SS might complain. Such complaints were normal, especially as Wehrmacht generals found themselves fighting defensive and attrition battles in the snow.

Hitler was well aware of this problem and had conducted a massive reshuffle of commanders at the General Staff and the front, replacing complainers with those willing to fight hard.

To Manstein's surprise, the Totenkopf did not complain. Division Commander Eicke only asked a few questions about the mission arrangements—all very useful tactical questions.

Manstein, a tactical expert himself, did not dislike such questions. While the Wehrmacht had some experience in winter combat, it was a situation they tried to avoid. Their most recent experience was the First World War, when they mostly held defensive lines against the Tsars in winter. While small actions continued, the front remained relatively stable. Only with the arrival of spring would the Wehrmacht choose to attack.

The questions Eicke posed were exactly the knowledge Manstein hoped to impart—combat techniques he hoped to perfect through Eicke's practice.

Commanding the Red Army, Zhukov also faced the problem of winter combat. Since the Tsarist era, it had been a major issue. The Russian military, understanding its homeland, also avoided large-scale winter operations.

Zhukov had no choice; he had to execute Stalin's orders. Fortunately, he held one trump card: the 10,000 half-tracks imported from China were now coming into their own. Small and low-profile, they could carry four men and provide offensive transport. One vehicle could transport a squad.

During the Battle of Moscow, these half-tracks had provided immense mobility, allowing the Red Army to rapidly move personnel and weapons to German breakthroughs to repel them and hold the lines.

However, these vehicles used an interleaved road wheel structure; while enhancing mobility, they were extremely difficult to maintain. The Soviets preferred to abandon a broken-down half-track rather than ship it back for repair.

After the Moscow campaign, only about 4,000 of the original 10,000 were still operational. The northern Red Army had been allocated 800, with the rest sent to Stalingrad for its recovery.

In his first assault, Zhukov committed 400 half-tracks and 120 tanks against the Germans at Demyansk.

When Division Commander Eicke received the report, his melancholy expression did not ripple. He only asked, "Are the special operations personnel ready?"

The firm voice of an SS commander came over the line: "They are ready."

Eicke then ordered: "Eliminate those Russian tanks, and the pressure on us will be greatly eased. This time, do not let a single tank return."

"Heil Victory!" came the reply.

Soon, Manstein also received word: Soviet armor had launched a fierce offensive. At this moment, the encircled 16th Army had only a bit over 100 operational tanks left. These were for counter-charges, not targeted strikes. This left Manstein extremely uneasy. He moved to mobilize nearby tank units for a counter-attack while calling Eicke to ask what he needed.

Expecting a long list of requests, he was surprised when Eicke replied calmly, "We can destroy the Russian offensive."

Putting down the phone, Manstein was dazed. The answer left him completely in the dark. Any Wehrmacht officer would have demanded everything from air support to tank reinforcements. The SS's cold reply made him feel something was very wrong, yet he could say nothing.

Manstein could only hope for now that the Waffen-SS's combat power could hold until aid arrived.