**Chapter 865: Cute Stalin (2)**

To Stalin, Li Runshi's *On Protracted War* was a strategic masterpiece. Had it only circulated outside the Soviet Union, he would have been more willing to adopt its useful points.

However, Chinese influence in the USSR was growing daily. If the ideas proposed in the document shook Stalin's decisions and became the strategic foundation of the nation, it would mean that China was, in essence, deeply interfering in Soviet internal affairs.

After ordering Beria to identify the "Pro-China faction" that relied too heavily on Beijing, Stalin turned his attention to the progress of the counter-offensive. He advocated for the total defeat of the Germans in a short time. Seeing the Red Army successfully employing the pincer tactics learned from the Wehrmacht, Stalin couldn't help but begin searching the map for key points where the enemy could be thoroughly crushed.

Currently, the primary axes of the counter-attack had achieved breakthroughs. The exhausted German lines had snapped, and their units, lacking the will to resist, were in hasty retreat. The Soviet assault groups, carrying only minimal supplies, were more mobile and flexible as a result.

The German withdrawal meant the Soviets didn't have to worry about their following units and supplies being struck; even attacking with only three days of food, they could be continuously replenished. Thus, on the map in the Demyansk sector, Soviet units were encircling several German armies.

In Army Group Center, the 9th, 3rd, and 4th Armies were already caught in the center of a massive Soviet pincer and faced potential encirclement.

In the south, the counter-attacking Red Army was encircling Stalingrad. Although the ring wasn't yet complete according to the plan, Soviet forces in Crimea posed a threat to the flank of Army Group South. If those units could break out, they might sever the retreat of over 600,000 Axis troops and surround the entire Southern Group.

At least on paper, the situation looked excellent for the Red Army. Stalin decided to pull units from the center of the German Army Group Center front to reinforce the flanks, aiming for an even larger encirclement. He hoped to annihilate the entire Army Group Center in one stroke.

Simultaneously, Stalin's gaze fell on Sychevka and Vyazma, south of Rzhev. Rzhev was a railway hub, as was Vyazma. The Germans were holding Rzhev to the death; Stalin believed the Red Army could send a powerful force to strike from the west, breach the German lines, and capture Sychevka and Vyazma.

In *On Protracted War*, Li Runshi had proposed that the Red Army should not be maneuvered by the Germans. In operational planning, one should "you fight your way, I'll fight mine," maneuvering the enemy rather than being maneuvered by them. While Stalin had no desire for Chinese interference, he thoroughly identified with these methodologies. Thus, he believed a breakthrough in the Sychevka-Vyazma axis would shatter German deployment and allow the Red Army to dominate the strategic development.

Word soon reached the Chinese side. Li Runshi already knew of the Soviet reaction to *On Protracted War*; even if he understood their wariness of foreign interference, he still felt disappointed. The Red Army had won the battle for Moscow; had Li been commanding, the purpose of the winter counter-offensive would not have been to annihilate the Germans wholesale, but to act according to their strength in the harsh weather, ensuring the battle-weary Red Army could recover and rapidly enhance its effectiveness before the next summer campaign.

Of course, this didn't mean the Red Army should remain idle. What was needed now was to maintain pressure, causing even greater chaos and loss for the Germans in the severe cold. The Soviets could then exploit the mistakes born of that chaos to achieve breakthroughs, thereby maneuvering and exhausting the enemy.

But taken as a whole, the Red Army's combat effectiveness was still inferior to the Wehrmacht's. Such maneuvering had to be done within reason, not through head-on brute force. War is conducted by living human beings: "Save the land but lose the people, and both are lost. Save the people but lose the land, and both are saved" (Cun ren shi di, ren di jie cun).

With these feelings, Li Runshi finished reading the intelligence from the USSR. From the analysis, it was clear Stalin believed retaking land was more important than preserving his soldiers' lives. Having made his judgment, Li ended the session.

Hu Xiushan, who had been analyzing with him, asked, "Vice Chairman Li, why end the study now?"

Li replied with some displeasure, "I find it hard to endure meaningless, large-scale casualties."

Hu stared at him, trying to discern his thoughts. Hu had experienced bloodbaths firsthand and had judged from the intelligence that the coming battles would be exceptionally bloody, with both sides paying a massive price.

Precisely because he had commanded such wars, Hu's own tolerance for meaningless slaughter was not high. In fact, this was true of the entire NDF high command. Because such carnage was unavoidable, strategists led by He Rui only engaged in attrition as a last resort. If any other feasible option existed, massive casualties were never the priority.

Hu identified with Li's view, but he wanted to understand its depth. Was the opposition to bloodbaths born of a physical dread, or from a genuine cherishing and respect for the soldiers?

But Li gave him no time for further study, immediately moving to the next agenda item: launching the annihilation of the remaining US forces in the South Pacific.

By December 25, 1942, in a desperate attempt to save the hundreds of thousands of troops trapped in Australia and New Zealand, the United States had made several efforts to establish large-scale maritime corridors. Every attempt had been struck fiercely by the Chinese military, with over a hundred engagements of varying scale breaking out along the routes to the South Pacific.

The US was truly desperate to control the lanes and held nothing back. Since the end of the Hawaii campaign, they had lost 88 submarines, 64 frigates, 97 destroyers, 29 cruisers, 3 battleships, and 2 carriers.

As China had few battleships, it suffered no losses in that category or in carriers; its total naval losses were less than half of America's. Coupled with the fact that the US strategic objective remained unfulfilled, China had already won control over the South Pacific waters.

Having suffered immense losses, the US Navy had dispatched no more forces to the South Pacific since the start of December. At this stage, Chinese surface and submarine units had essentially isolated America from Australia and New Zealand. Since the US had abandoned the attempt to save its troops, China would naturally seize the entire region, ending the Pacific War phase and beginning the next stage of operations.

胡 Xiushan saw no issue with the high-intensity, high-ferocity war fought between the Allies and the Asian Alliance in the Pacific. All Allied operations had chosen the most effective models and had been fully prepared to maximize their potential.

The Pacific War appeared cruel only because the most effective model happened to be one of attrition. In designing these operations, the Asian Allied Command under Xu Chengfeng had conducted maximum simulations. With tens of thousands of officers and over a thousand computers, even the most unorthodox ideas were simulated as long as they were feasible. the process and results closely matched the simulations, which could be considered a total success.

The reason Hu disagreed with Stalin's command was something Sun Tzu had explained two millennia ago: "The skilled warrior positions himself where he cannot be defeated and does not miss an opportunity to defeat the enemy. Therefore, the victorious army is victorious first and then seeks battle; the defeated army seeks battle first and then seeks victory. One who is skilled in war cultivates the Way and preserves the Law, thus becoming the master of victory and defeat."

The USSR had won the Battle of Moscow because they chose the correct strategy: building massive fortifications in the decisive sector and utilizing the vast land and harsh climate to exhaust the Germans before launching focused breakthroughs.

But after the victory, Stalin's command seemed to follow the rules of a traditional counter-attack, yet in reality it did not. When the Soviets struck back, while the Germans were vulnerable, the roles of offense and defense had shifted. The Red Army, lacking sustained combat capability, became the passive party.

On December 19, Hitler dismissed von Brauchitsch and assumed personal command of the Army. He issued an order stating: "Everyone must hold their current position and fight back. When there are no prepared positions in the rear, retreat is absolutely prohibited." Although his generals had repeatedly requested a withdrawal—and both Guderian and Hoepner were dismissed for doing so without authorization—Hitler believed a retreat would lead to a Napoleonic disaster. While his stubbornness had brought the campaign to the brink of catastrophe, it also prevented him from falling into the abyss. There was no doubt that by refusing to withdraw from the USSR or from areas east of Smolensk, he saved his army from a fate worse than 1812.

Hitler's plan differed from Napoleon's: instead of a total retreat, he moved units toward the rear, turning his former supply lines into defensive strongpoints. By late December, the Red Army had retaken Kaluga in the southwest, Kalinin in the northwest, and relieved Tula in the southeast. The Battle of Moscow ended, giving the Red Army its first major victory of the war. The Germans lost over 500,000 men, 1,300 tanks, and 250 vehicles, along with vast amounts of other equipment. They were forced to abandon the Blitzkrieg for a protracted war.

At such a time, the Soviets clearly failed to recognize the change in German strategy and continued attempting large-scale encirclements. This was simply blind meddling.