The British Burma Army deployed on the border between Lower Burma and Upper Burma consisted of three corps. Each corps had two Indian brigades, and each brigade had six battalions. Simply from the perspective of organization, it was somewhat similar to China's reform of divisions into brigades. The timing of the organizational adjustment was also about the same as in China.

This was not because the British Indian Army had also modernized. Before 1927, the British Indian Army used the battalion as the basic combat unit. The British Indian Army's main combat targets had always been resistance organizations in India proper, which did not require particularly large units. After 1927, due to the de facto defeat, the British Ministry of Defence believed that larger combat units must be organized to cope with Chinese infantry divisions.

Britain was not at ease with the local Indian troops; once a division-level combat unit mutinied, it would be very difficult to control. The British added a permanent brigade-level command system to the original battalion-level combat units, achieving a balance between combat scale and suppressing rebellious troops. Above the brigade was the corps-level command system, not the division level. Corps-level combat units were temporary organizations that would only appear during wartime and would be disbanded after the war, so there was naturally no need to worry about the entire corps rebelling.

By 1941, Britain had formed 72 brigades for the war, of which 36 had been completed, fully equipped and manned, and were undergoing training.

Major General William dispatched the 29th Brigade. Upon receiving the order, the brigade commander, Colonel Marco, immediately ordered the 2nd Battalion of his unit, composed of Gurkhas, to launch a rescue operation as the vanguard. In the British Indian troops, in terms of daring to fight and struggle, the Gurkhas were second to none, followed by the Sikhs. Whether a British Indian unit belonged to the elite depended on the proportion of Gurkhas and Sikhs in the unit.

A Class A British Indian Brigade consisted of 2 Gurkha infantry battalions, 3 Sikh infantry battalions, 1 Muslim logistics battalion, and 1 Hindu artillery battery.

A Class B British Indian unit consisted of 1 Gurkha infantry battalion, 2 Sikh infantry battalions, 2 Hindu infantry battalions, 1 Muslim logistics battalion, and 1 Hindu artillery battery.

A Class C British Indian unit consisted of 1 Sikh infantry battalion, 4 Hindu or Muslim infantry battalions, 1 Muslim logistics battalion, and 1 Hindu artillery battery.

With Britain's current organization, Brigades 1-24 were Class A brigades, 25-48 were Class B brigades, and 49-72 were Class C brigades.

The 29th Brigade was a Class B unit. Colonel Marco, the brigade commander, felt that perhaps this unit should take a defensive stance against the Chinese army, but fighting the army of Upper Burma, a former British colony, would be a piece of cake.

On the position, Dan Tuo, commander of the 3rd Regiment, 2nd Division of the Republic of Upper Burma National Defense Force, was also nervous for a moment after receiving the news that a British Indian army was charging over. He touched the badge of the Baoding Military Academy on his chest and silently recited twice in his heart, "I am a Baoding cadet! I am a Baoding cadet!" Under such self-adjustment, Dan Tuo's mood quickly relaxed a lot.

In 1927, 12-year-old Dan Tuo, who had become a monk at the age of 10 following local customs and had read a little Buddhist scripture with the old monk and recognized a few characters, was selected by the government to attend school. After graduating from an accelerated class at the age of 16, he went to a military school in Yunnan, China, to study infantry for three years. Because of his outstanding academic performance among his peers, he went to the Baoding Military Academy at the age of 19 to study for two years, and then served in the Chinese National Defense Force for one year. At the age of 23, he returned to serve in the Army of the Republic of Upper Burma and was appointed as a battalion commander.

During his tenure as a battalion commander, Dan Tuo led his troops to participate in the military mission of taking over Indochina. Because of his outstanding performance, he went to Yunnan for half a year of training after returning to China, and was promoted to regiment commander after returning to his country.

The predecessor of the Baoding Military Academy was the Baoding Military Officers School. Although He Rui did not study here nor teach here, the "Five Tiger Generals" under He Rui all graduated from this school. In China, the reputation of the Baoding Military Academy was equal to that of the Changshan Military Academy established by the southward-relocated branch of the former Northeast Military Academy.

After completing the simple self-mentality adjustment, Dan Tuo immediately rushed to the front line. Through the telescope, he soon saw the enemy opposite advancing. After watching for a minute, Dan Tuo couldn't help but recite two more sentences silently, "I am a Baoding cadet! I am a Baoding cadet!"

This seemingly self-hypnotic practice was really not self-hypnosis. The reason Baoding Military Academy dared to be so confident was that Baoding Military Academy was extremely excellent in army combat research. This academy had mastered the most advanced army tactics of various countries in the world, and based on this understanding, built a very powerful simulation system.

During his studies at the Baoding Military Academy, Dan Tuo mastered the theory and technology suitable for infantry combat, and his elective course was the combat characteristics of the armies of countries surrounding the Republic of Upper Burma.

Before the war, based on intelligence gathering, the Upper Burma Army roughly learned the designation of the British Burma Army opposite. Added to this was the organization of the British Indian troops obtained from the intelligence cooperation system between the Upper Burma National Defense Force and the Chinese National Defense Force. Just by watching for a minute, Dan Tuo was basically certain that the enemy opposite was advancing in the mode that the Gurkha battalion was best at.

In the Baoding Military School, the military philosophy Dan Tuo learned was no different from that of his Chinese classmates of the same period: officers undertook the work of engineers. Understand the situation opposite, understand the situation of the tools at hand, use the learned laws of war, and use one's own tools to process the opposite side into the desired result.

The biggest characteristic of Gurkha infantry was that they were not afraid of death, were well-equipped, and had sufficient training. These Gurkhas from the mountainous areas of Nepal lived very hard lives and couldn't even afford underwear. In the Gurkha region, "having underwear to wear" was a common saying, meaning being conscripted into the army by the British.

Gurkha troops first became famous during the Indian Rebellion of 1857. At that time, most of the British Indian troops participated in the uprising. When Britain was in chaos, Gurkha mercenaries from the mountainous areas of Nepal rose up to fight and helped the British army stabilize the situation. Since then, Britain had loved using these Gurkha soldiers very much.

Gurkha soldiers came from the mountainous areas of Nepal and belonged to a different race from the people on the Indian subcontinent, making them excellent candidates for "using barbarians to control barbarians." Britain treated Gurkha soldiers as elites. Gurkha soldiers recruited into the British Indian Army could receive very good treatment; it was truly "one person joins the army, the whole family escapes poverty." Britain conducted training for Gurkha soldiers comparable to the level of the British mainland, and their equipment was not inferior to that of British mainland soldiers. It was just that the cultural level of Gurkha soldiers was low, and they couldn't master the most advanced technical equipment. Even so, in the evaluation and simulation of the Baoding Military Academy, when this army adopted traditional infantry assault tactics, its combat effectiveness was quite outstanding because they were not afraid of death and were well-trained.

In the simulation battle with the same equipment, the Chinese National Defense Force had two countermeasures. The first was to exert the huge advantage of the bayonet over the Gurkha kukri in close combat.

In the Baoding Military Officers School, there were few soldiers shorter than 165 cm, and those soldiers were basically students majoring in military equipment research. Gurkha soldiers were generally around 160 cm, which indeed did not appear short compared with British soldiers whose average height was around 163 cm, but was obviously more than half a head shorter than Chinese troops who were around 170 cm. Chinese soldiers were tall and strong, using long weapons like rifles with bayonets against Gurkha kukris, and easily defeated Gurkha troops in bayonet fighting.

The officers and soldiers of the Upper Burma Army were similar to Gurkha soldiers in height, weight, and physique. Dan Tuo believed that the Upper Burma Army was not suitable for this tactic.

Soon, Dan Tuo, who had formulated the relevant tactics, began to command the battle. The Gurkha troops were indeed Britain's elite. The British army did not use the lives of Gurkha soldiers to explore the way, but used 75mm rapid-firing guns to bombard the position of the Upper Burma Army violently. Under the cover of artillery fire, the Gurkha battalion launched a rapid attack with the shelling, striving to tear a hole in the Upper Burma Army's defense line.

Just as the Gurkha battalion expected, as long as the Upper Burma Army did not gain an advantage in the firefight, when the Gurkha infantry approached the temporary field defense line of the Upper Burma Army through well-trained tactical movements such as crawling and bounding, the Upper Burma Army abandoned the position and began to retreat. Although it couldn't be said to have reached the level of a hot knife cutting through butter, the Gurkha battalion also successfully drove the Upper Burma Army out of their temporary positions.

Just then, the 105mm light howitzers of the Upper Burma Army began to bombard the artillery position of the British Burma Army. The Chinese-made 105mm howitzers had exerted great power since the Sino-Japanese War of 1922. Unlike the old-style rifles provided by China to foreign countries, artillery barrels had a lifespan. During the great military expansion, the old-style artillery was worn out in training, so it happened to be all replaced with new ones.

The characteristic of the new artillery was the extensive use of new electronic equipment. Upper Burma's basic education had developed well in the past ten-plus years, and ordinary artillerymen could achieve the level that previously required very experienced artillery non-commissioned officers by operating the equipment. In addition, the Upper Burma Army was fully prepared and measured accurately. The British army looked down on the strength of the Upper Burma Army too much; the 75mm guns fired from the same position for too long and were located by the Chinese counter-battery calculator. Three rapid-fire salvos from the 105mm howitzer group silenced the British artillery battery.

At this time, the Upper Burma Air Force taking off from the rear air base also arrived at the front line. They did not participate in the battle immediately but began to cruise and alert, ready to deal with the British Air Force that might appear at any time.

The Gurkha infantry battalion was indeed an elite force considered disciplined and brave in battle. Even in the situation where they lost artillery cover and enemy planes appeared, seeing that they were not far from the British reconnaissance squad, they instead launched a fierce attack with the strength of a company, with one company following up to maintain the battle line, leaving one company to secure the retreat route.

"Really good," Dan Tuo praised the map on which a series of changes in the advance and retreat positions of both sides had already been drawn. As a Baoding cadet, he had the habit of having enough maps. This map would be summarized together with the combat report after the battle, so there was no problem drawing more things on it.

Just as the vanguard of the Gurkha infantry battalion arrived at a small position held by the British reconnaissance squad and prepared to retreat with the British reconnaissance squad, the 105mm artillery battalion of the Upper Burma Army began to shell the British positions south of the border violently. The Upper Burma Air Force began to bomb and strafe driving J-8 fighters, blocking the contact between the British army and the Gurkha battalion.

The military system of the Upper Burma Army adopted the Chinese 1924 organization, and the troops adopted the "three-three" system, with one regiment having three battalions. Originally, the one fighting and retreating on the front was the 1st Battalion. When artillery fire and aircraft cut off the contact between the Gurkha battalion and its brigade, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions had already started to outflank from the two sides they had moved to.

This was the second method of dealing with the Gurkha battalion in the simulation battle with equal equipment at the Baoding Military Academy. Elites all had elite confidence. If the Gurkha battalion only fought steadily in the attack, it wouldn't be called elite. Since the Gurkha battalion dared to thrust in, we dared to shut the door to beat the dog.

It was just that this targeted tactic required the commander to understand his troops very well. If the troops luring the enemy on the front were not elite enough and could not retreat in an orderly manner in response to the enemy's attack, but were bitten by the enemy or even routed, "shutting the door to beat the dog" would become "failing to beat the dog and getting bitten instead."

Dan Tuo knew his troops very well and took the training of the troops very seriously. The 1st Battalion was the unit he commanded when he was a battalion commander, and this unit could handle heavy responsibilities. Sure enough, applying all the knowledge learned in the Baoding Military Academy, the battle went very smoothly.

The surrounded Gurkha battalion was indeed elite, but the Gurkha battalion was still flesh and blood, not invincible bodies of steel. Facing the encirclement, the Gurkha battalion immediately contracted its defense, but the Lee-Enfield rifles they used were still bolt-action rifles. The British Army once installed a continuous firing device on the Lee-Enfield, but the Army lords found that the soldiers would fire desperately, causing excessive bullet consumption. The British Army lords then cancelled the continuous firing device.

Although the semi-automatic rifles used by the Upper Burma Army were not fully automatic either, they didn't need to pull the bolt; they could shoot just by pulling the trigger, and the rate of fire greatly exceeded that of the Lee-Enfield rifle. The infantry 60mm mortars of the Upper Burma Army fired violently at targets that the infantry could not take immediately. There was a joke circulating in the Baoding Military Academy that a Beiyang warlord named Zhang Bangchang loved to write doggerel verse, and one sentence "The cannon opens fire and bombs his mother" became a golden sentence. Militarily speaking, that was what cannons were used for.

The battle was very fierce. On average, every three Gurkha soldiers took two shells. Under such close-range shelling and the fierce and sharp attack of the Upper Burma Army, in less than an hour, the attacking Gurkha battalion along with the British reconnaissance squad were annihilated.

At this time, the British artillery in this direction joined the artillery duel. The Upper Burma Army did not spoil the British either; the regimental artillery regiment returned fire violently. For a time, the sound of cannons rumbled on the positions of both sides, and the sound of shell explosions rose one after another. Without cleaning up the battlefield, Dan Tuo immediately commanded the troops to take the prisoners and withdraw into the defensive positions.

In the safe shelter, Dan Tuo roughly counted the consumption. If only calculating the launch volume of 60mm mortars, 3 shells and hundreds of bullets solved one Gurkha soldier. According to the war history knowledge Dan Tuo learned in the military academy, in World War I, both sides fired hundreds of millions of shells and tens of billions of bullets. In the end, a total of 15 million soldiers and civilians died. The combat efficiency of the battle he executed was much higher than that of European countries in World War I.

The artillery duel between the two sides lasted less than an hour before ending the show of strength. The Upper Burma Air Force fought a rather fierce battle with the British Air Force. Although the British Air Force was well-trained and had good combat effectiveness, the Upper Burma Air Force dealt with the British army by relying on superior numbers.

In the end, Britain had 3 fighters shot down and 8 damaged. The Upper Burma Air Force had 4 shot down and 7 damaged. The British Air Force withdrew from the air battle first. Although the air battle was considered a draw, the Upper Burma Army only withdrew its troops after carrying out a bombing run on the British Burma Army positions south of the border line. Psychologically, the Upper Burma Army gained an advantage.

After the battle, Major General William, the British frontline commander who had counted the losses, plucked up the courage to contact Lieutenant General Bella. He stated seriously, "Maybe the army opposite is not Upper Burmese, but Chinese."

"Major General, why do you think so?" Lieutenant General Bella did not get angry, but just asked coldly. He also received the Air Force's report. Although the Upper Burma Army's fighters were also J-8 fighters, the Royal Air Force was not afraid of Upper Burma pilots. But in the air battle, the British pilots with rich combat experience did not achieve the one-sided slaughter they expected. The enemy basically fought 2 against 1, making the British pilots tired of coping. This should not be the level of the Upper Burma Air Force.

"Commander, the enemy's battle command was very smooth, and the combat level was very high. I think the reason why no signs of Chinese troops entering Upper Burma on a large scale were found is that Chinese soldiers have already dispersed into Upper Burma, posing as Upper Burma soldiers and replacing the Upper Burma Army." Major General William stated his judgment. After speaking, he believed in his judgment even more. It was impossible for a local army capable of fighting back and forth with the British army to appear in Southeast Asia!